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UNIONS IN A FRAGMENTED SOCIETY
CHRISTOPHER GRANT*

INTRODUCTION
In the opening paragraphs of Democracy’s Discontent, Michael
Sandel observes: “Our public life is rife with discontent. Americans
do not believe they have much to say in how they are governed and
do not trust the government to do the right thing.”1 He cites figures
from a Gallup poll that three-fourths of Americans are “dissatisfied
with the way the political process is working.”2 A similar percentage
“believe[s] that government is run by a few big interests rather than
for the benefit of all.”3 Additionally, Sandel sees in people the fear
that “from family to neighborhood to nation, the moral fabric of
community is unraveling around us.”4 Not only do Americans sense a
loss of self-government, but we also lack the tools of tradition and
moral belief to guide us in self-government. This said, Sandel argues,
the political arguments of the day are not at fault for our anxiety. It is
not as if we have made the wrong decisions about welfare or health
care. Rather, Sandel contends, it is our liberal public philosophy—
with its view of persons as free and independent selves,
unencumbered by moral ties they have not chosen—that is to blame.
That is, to come to grips with our anxiety, we must look beyond the
political arguments that currently confound us to the theory that
animates them. Our discontent can be attributed to the rise of a
liberal public philosophy over a republican one.
Sandel does not dwell on the question of who feels discontented.
His book is dedicated to explaining why people feel this way. This is
unfair criticism because Sandel is not a sociologist, but a political
theorist. Nevertheless, Sandel speaks broadly. Seemingly all
* B.A., Carleton College, 1994; J.D., University of Illinois College of Law, 2001. I am
very thankful to Professor Carlos Ball for his guidance, and to my colleagues at Schuchat, Cook
& Werner for their support.
1. MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 3 (1996).
2. Id. at 353 n.1.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 3.
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Americans to some extent are anxious these days. Yet, this cannot
truly be the case. I doubt graduates of Harvard or Yale—the elite—
feel less powerful today than they did one hundred or two hundred
years ago. And I doubt the wealthy feel any less powerful today than
they did in the eighteenth or nineteenth century. They may not now
be mostly white Protestants, and this is for the better. But,
disproportionately, they are the ones still making the important
decisions. Furthermore, one wonders who is feeling a loss of
community. Again, the elite, to the extent that they ever had a
community, still have that community. Certain other groups are also
more resistant, though not impervious, to atomization. For instance,
recent immigrants tend to live together and to continue to hold onto
their traditions and customs. And African Americans, perhaps
because they have historically been deprived of the right of selfgovernment, cling more strongly to their beliefs and politics. African
Americans in all social strata are more religiously observant, though
their church attendance, like that of whites, has recently declined.5
Who, then, is Sandel talking about? One obvious answer is the
working class, specifically the white working class. There are two
reasons for this answer. First, more so than individuals in other
groups, members of the working class suffer the effects of what
Michael Walzer calls the Four Mobilities: geographic mobility, social
mobility, marital mobility, and political mobility.6 Members are more
likely to own a home today than a generation ago, but they spend
more time commuting.7 Blue-collar workers suffer greater job
instability, and feel more anxious.8 They endure high divorce rates.9
And, they are politically apathetic, or at least are less likely to vote as
than their parents.10 Second, as other nodes of community life, such
as the church and the neighborhood group, disappear, the workplace
has become increasingly central to identity.11 But having to work
5. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 76 (2000).
6. Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 12–13
(1990).
7. PUTNAM, supra note 5, at 205, 212–15.
8. See id. at 88–92. However, white-collar workers also increasingly suffer from greater
instability. Id. at 89.
9. See id. at 277–79. As does everyone else, but those who make less surely feel the
effects of divorce more.
10. Witness the 2000 election furor over independent voters in such blue-collar states as
Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
11. “The long and short of it is this: Working for pay now occupies more of the time of
more of our populace than ever. The job has become a central part of most adults’ lives and
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lower-wage jobs, contingent jobs, and sometimes multiple jobs,
members of the working class struggle to make ends meet. It is no
wonder, then, that they feel disempowered and anxious. They find
themselves defined by jobs in which they have little personal investment.12
With this in mind, Sandel’s book has important things to say
about unions. Democracy’s Discontent has generated great discussion
among academics.13 But given the number of pages that Sandel
spends mapping out a republican political economy, including his
praise for the Knights of Labor and Samuel Gompers,14 it is surprising
how few have taken to heart his ideas in relation to unions. In
republican politics, what is the role of unions? What effect does a
republican public philosophy have on labor law? Certainly, we
cannot, and should not, simply search to recapture the past. In our
global economy, that would be impossible. Forces beyond one
nation’s control prevent turning back the clock. Moreover, such calls
for a return to the past suggest a myopic romanticism. To be sure, the
working class was once far more engaged and farsighted. But the
working class could also be small minded. Certain groups of immigrants dominated their unions to their own advantage, excluding
other groups to those groups’ disadvantage.
Thomas Kohler, for one, has explored what I would term a “republican interpretation” of unions and labor law. I will spend much
of Part I of this Note examining his understanding of unions as
“seedbeds of the civic virtues.”15 I will also address the liberal view of
associations in general and unions in particular, paralleling the rise of
“rights talk” in recent constitutional jurisprudence and the labor laws.
being employed (by one or more employers) is the way people spend the major share of their
waking hours.” Thomas C. Kohler, The Overlooked Middle, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 229, 233
(1993) [hereinafter Kohler, The Overlooked Middle]; see also PUTNAM, supra note 5, at 86.
12. Robert Putnam reports that Americans today are not working as hard as their parents
did at the height of the civic boom in the 1960s. Additionally, the free time available to lesseducated Americans has increased since the 1960s, while that of their college-educated
counterparts has decreased. PUTNAM, supra note 5, at 190. Yet, Putnam finds that those with
the heaviest time pressures are those who are more likely, not less likely, to be civically
involved. Id. at 191. At first blush, this seems counterintuitive. But it may be that those who
feel less invested in their work feel less invested in civil society. Interestingly enough, Putnam’s
research indicates that watching television is the activity most lethal to community involvement.
Id. at 216–46. Do those with dull, menial jobs enjoy (need?) the escape of television more than
those with interesting jobs?
13. See, e.g., DEBATING DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT (Anita L. Allen & Milton C. Regan,
Jr. eds., 1998).
14. See SANDEL, supra note 1, at 123–273.
15. Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic Virtues, 36
B.C. L. REV. 279, 295 (1995) [hereinafter Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work].
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Finally, I will propose that we pursue a pragmatic view, rather than a
republican or liberal view, of associations based upon our fragmentation. In Part II, then, I will consider majority rule in unions, and
suggest that, following a pragmatic view, it would be preferable to
adopt a scheme of nonmajority, or proportional, representation.16
I.

THEORETICAL VIEWS

Section A analyzes republican and liberal views of associations.
Section B examines the role of unions in light of these views. Finally,
Section C argues that taking a pragmatic view will improve efforts at
reform. If social fragmentation is our problem, then that is where we
should begin.
A. Republican and Liberal Views of Associations
Democracy’s Discontent portrays American history as a clash of
two competing public philosophies: liberalism and republicanism.
Sandel’s thesis is short and sweet. The liberal conception of freedom
with its view of persons as free and independent selves, unencumbered by moral or civic ties that they have not chosen, is insufficient
to address our current discontent. “For despite its appeal, the liberal
vision of freedom lacks the civic resources to sustain selfgovernment,” and it “cannot secure the liberty it promises, because it
cannot inspire the sense of community and civic engagement that
liberty requires.”17 By contrast, the republican conception of
freedom, which once predominated, does speak to our discontent.
With its view that liberty depends upon sharing in self-government,
which in turn requires certain qualities of character, the republican
conception is unafraid to take up and cultivate the needs of civic
life—economic, moral, or otherwise. That is, republican politics is a
formative politics, willing to address the ends citizens espouse.
Though Sandel does not deeply analyze the role of associations,
throughout Democracy’s Discontent he praises Tocqueville’s philosophy of using multiple and diverse civic and political bodies to fill the
spaces between persons, and between persons and the state. Such a
“clamorous” republican politics, Sandel contends, is preferable to any

16. Of course, statutory reform would be necessary for any such scheme. Currently,
employers are only required to bargain with exclusive representatives.
17. SANDEL, supra note 1, at 6.
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unitary vision of citizens as a single body, and is in fact necessary to
the cultivation of civic virtues.18 Tocqueville’s republican politics
does not despise differentiation. . . . [I]t fills this space with public
institutions that gather people together in various capacities, that
both separate and relate them. These institutions include the townships, schools, religions, and virtue-sustaining occupations that form
the “character of mind” and “habits of the heart” a democratic republic requires. Whatever their more particular purposes, these
agencies of civic education inculcate the habit of attending to public
things.19

As noted above, Sandel prescribes a formative politics. For the state
and each citizen to be free, the state must have a stake in the character of its citizens. Sandel admits that “bad communities may form bad
characters.”20 But it is not entirely clear whether Sandel would have
the government intervene in associational life to prevent the
formation of bad characters. For instance, what are we to do about
obstinate ascriptive affiliations, such as religious fundamentalist
groups, that ferment hate? Sandel seems to walk a fine line. On the
one hand, he recognizes that associational obligations can claim
citizens, so that these groups in some way transcend the state.21 On
the other hand, Sandel espouses a freedom among individuals and
groups that is only possible in a shared culture within a state. Thus, it
seems for Sandel that freedom is only possible where associations and
the democratic state arise concurrently.22
This said, Sandel’s republicanism, with its understanding of the
self claimed by community, is particularly sensitive to using certain

18. Id. at 319–20.
19. Id. at 320–21 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 347 (stressing the republican benefits of
political bodies between the individual and the state, such as townships).
20. Id. at 321.
21. In fact, liberalism first goes wrong, Sandel argues, in its inability to account for
obligations we recognize to groups above and beyond obligations we recognize to the state. If
we understand ourselves as free and independent selves, by which we only owe respect to others
as free and independent selves, we cannot explain why we sometimes feel more loyal to some
than others. Yet, we often do. The prototypical example is Robert E. Lee, who, even though he
opposed secession, chose his home, the South, over his country, the Union. Id. at 13–17.
22. When discussing associations, Sandel cites Hegel. Id. at 401 n.7 (citing G.W.F. HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF THE RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1821)). Nancy
Rosenblum would argue that Sandel is misreading Tocqueville and Hegel in that Sandel too
closely equates associational life and citizenship. She contends that theorists taking a
“mediating approach” to civil society, following Tocqueville, can only hope that associations will
cultivate benign and democratic dispositions in their members. NANCY ROSENBLUM,
MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS 41–45 (1998). This view, she says, “rests . . . on an airy liberal
expectancy.” Id. at 45. Moreover, this view ignores Hegel’s lesson that “[a]ssociation
membership is a distinctive ‘moment’ in social and personal life. It cannot be dissolved into
citizenship.” Id. at 46.
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ties and attachments to cultivate a concern for the whole. Group life
educates people in the exercise of citizenship by familiarizing them
with cooperation and directing them to common ends beyond
immediate self-interest. Such lessons, Sandel contends, get the short
shrift today, as political liberalism, which gives priority to individual
choice of values, is unwilling to address the virtues essential to
citizenship. Further, under political liberalism, the work of associations has been usurped by the state. Despite the liberal view of the
freely-choosing and autonomous self, relations between persons are
increasingly no longer left to individuals themselves, but are guided
by social legislation.23
Like Sandel, Thomas Kohler argues that our present public philosophy is insufficient. Kohler asks “whether modern liberalism, with
its limited conception of community, ends up by undermining the
social conditions necessary to sustain its noble project of enhancing
individual status and personal liberty.”24 And, like Sandel, Kohler
argues that a republican conception of freedom is preferable.25 Such a
conception begins with the proper understanding of the ‘self.’ In
contrast to liberalism, which abstracts the individual, the republican
conception takes humans as “situated beings” and intelligible “only in
relation to those associations that fundamentally condition human
existence.”26 Communities, in fact, give us our identity. They tell us
“the purpose and significance of our lives.” From this, it is but a small
step to a formative politics that addresses ends:
[C]ommunities have a normative function, and well-functioning
communities represent an irreducible human good. In this perspective, communities and associations [of every sort] exist only for the
individual. Yet, the social good is prior—stands at a higher level
than—the individual good, because without it, the good for discrete, individual persons could not exist.27

Kohler also emphasizes the importance of associations. Following Tocqueville, he stresses the “importance of mediating groups and

23. SANDEL, supra note 1, at 116–19.
24. Thomas C. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, 1993 BYU L. REV.
727, 740–41 [hereinafter Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work].
25. Kohler does not call himself a republican. Nevertheless, his reasoning is republican. I
want to be careful not to conflate Tocqueville, republicans, and communitarians because there
are essential differences between the three.
26. Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, Our First
Amendment Discourse and the Problem of DeBartolo, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 149, 206 [hereinafter
Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule].
27. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work, supra note 27, at 295.
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their potential to act as schools for democracy.”28 In coming together,
individuals must take control over their own affairs and learn to work
with others. In doing so, they learn the habits essential to selfgovernment. Associating requires a common effort to some end, and
so requires that individuals deliberate and reflect upon their goals.
Or, associations “set the conditions for the sort of civic friendships
that hold a society together and that facilitate the civil conversations
that ground self-rule.”29 Through them, we learn critical virtues such
as tolerance, cooperation, and independence, and “gain some sense of
the fullness of our . . . potencies.”30 Without them, we withdraw and
society breaks down.
Naturally, liberal theorists do not dismiss associations. In fact,
liberal theorists make them a priority. John Rawls, for one, describes
the just society as “social union of social unions.”31 On its face, such a
description does not seem all that different than Sandel’s and
Kohler’s understanding of associations as mediating bodies or
“schools for democracy.” It recognizes that the state requires tolerant
citizens, and that democracy depends upon associations to cultivate
the requisite civic habits and moral dispositions. Behind this
similarity, there are sharp differences. Rawls is careful to distinguish
between the state and associations: “A well-ordered democratic
society is neither a community nor, more generally, an association.”32
Most importantly, a democratic society “is also closed . . . in that entry
into it is only by birth and exit from it is only by death” and a
democratic society “has no final ends and aims in the way that
persons or associations do.”33 That is, Rawls, unlike Sandel and
Kohler, does not conflate citizenship with associational life. Freedom
does not rest on the integration of the individual into the state
through associations. Rather, separation of the state from associations preserves freedom for the individual. Typically, liberals speak
of separate spheres—public and private. Any talk of aims or ends in
the public sphere must fall under a political conception of justice and
its public reason. This means, as indicated by the liberal conception
of the self, that citizens cannot think there are certain values that
justify the belief that some people have intrinsically more worth to
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, supra note 24, at 730–31.
Id. at 731.
Id.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 527 (1971).
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 40 (1993).
Id. at 40–41.
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society than others. Instead, society owes respect to each person
equally as a free and independent self.34 By contrast, people in the
private sphere may join together to pursue other—even elitist—
values. People may choose their groups and choose their values.
Sidestepping Sandel’s claim, for the moment, that individuals
cannot simply choose their groups and values but are sometimes
chosen by groups and values, the liberal view considers the state as
prior to the group or existing before the group. According to liberal
theory, democratic authority is only possible once talk of aims and
ends has been removed from the public sphere and relegated to the
private. “The designation of a distinctive public sphere [is meant] to
control the influence of private associations.”35 The state maintains a
neutral stance towards associations in that it does not favor one group
over another and it limits any one group’s influence in the public
sphere (such as that of a religious group). Further, to ensure such
limits, the state may restrict the power that associations exercise over
their own members.36 That is, to some extent, the state may intervene
in association policies and practices. If the state could not, and
associations could, for example, compel membership or exclude
whomever they wanted, then associations could deprive individuals of
the very things—individual liberty and equal worth—that the state is
meant to preserve and protect. For this reason, certain liberals
believe that associations that exact too heavy a toll on excluded
individuals may be treated as if they were arms of the state by
subjecting them to the same standards of respect for individual rights
as apply to the state.37 Or, as put by others, the goal is “congruence
between the internal life . . . of . . . groups” and public norms and
culture.38 For example, discriminatory private groups may be forced
to accept members when exclusion results in second-class citizenship.
Of course, few advocate congruence to every group and every private
practice. To be viable, groups must have some authority to discipline
their members. Otherwise, groups cannot protect what they stand
for. But, as more and more aspects of group life are constitutionalized, groups find it increasingly harder to preserve their beliefs.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 41.
NANCY ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LIBERALISM 60 (1987).
Id.
Voluntarists speak of the principle of symmetry. See SHELDON LEADER, FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN LABOR LAW AND POLITICAL THEORY 52 (1992).
38. See Nancy Rosenblum, Compelled Association: Public Standing, Self-Respect, and the
Dynamic of Exclusion, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 75, 75 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998).
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The Role of Unions and Developments in Labor Law

Sandel makes brief mention of unions: “Family, neighborhood,
religion, trade unions, reform movements, and local government all
offer examples of practices that have at times served to educate
people in the exercise of citizenship by cultivating the habits of
membership and orienting people to common goods beyond their
private ends.”39 Kohler, a labor law professor, is more explicit.
Kohler argues that unions are essential because they can and do
involve people in a conversation “about what ought to be valued and
why.”40 Though the conversations of collective bargaining may seem
trivial—concerning promotions, seniority, wage rates, health insurance, and the like—Kohler thinks it a mistake to discount the
mundane. It is not so much the subject that is important, but the
practice. These types of discussions force individuals to make hard
choices about the rules that determine their daily work lives and then
justify these decisions to others.41 They require that we learn to
compromise, and they get us in the habit of self-directed action.
“Individuals and societies alike become and remain self-governing
only by repeatedly and regularly engaging in acts of self-government.
It is the habit that sustains the condition.”42 Certainly, employment
does not wholly define the individual. Work is something that
individuals often hope to avoid. But, at the very least, setting
contract goals, deciding strategy, and bargaining become an
important dimension of a worker’s experience. Moreover, such
practices require that workers learn to tolerate setbacks and
differences of opinion.
Of particular interest to Kohler is the decline in union membership over the last few decades. Approximately 34 percent of the US
private-sector workforce was organized in 1960. By 1992, only 12
percent was organized, and the percentage continues to fall.43 There
are countless theories explaining this phenomenon, including
globalization, increasing employer opposition, and weak enforcement
of labor laws. But, as Kohler astutely notes, these figures are not

39. SANDEL, supra note 1, at 117 (emphasis added).
40. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work, supra note 27, at 299.
41. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, supra note 24, at 734.
42. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work, supra note 27, at 298.
43. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, supra note 24, at 734–35 (citing
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1992, at 422
(112th ed. 1992)).
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unique to unions.44 Data suggests that over the past thirty years
participation in a wide variety of civic associations has plummeted.
Since 1970, Elks lodges have lost 46 percent of their members; since
1969, the League of Women Voters has lost 61 percent of its members; and, since 1966, the PTA has lost 60 percent of its members.45
Understanding why membership in civic associations, such as
neighborhood groups, religion, reform movements, and unions, has
declined is not easy. Both Sandel and Kohler agree that it has
something to do with the limitations of political liberalism. Sandel
states: “[T]he procedural republic is often inhospitable to claims
premised on self-definitions such as these. It brackets the constitutive
ties that the republican tradition sees as essential to political education.”46 And, Kohler notes: “[W]e increasingly no longer see the need
for or the significance of these mediating bodies. . . . Briefly stated, we
suffer from an odd sort of blindness: we can only see individuals.”47
More specifically, Sandel traces our predicament to changes in our
constitutional jurisprudence and Kohler to changes in labor and
employment law.
Sandel spends the first one-third of his book tracing the
ascendancy of “rights talk” and the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.48 By the mid-1940s, the Supreme Court had assumed
as its primary role the protection of individual rights.49 It defined
those rights according to the requirement that the Constitution be
read as neutral among ends, and defended that neutrality as essential
to respecting persons as free and independent selves, unencumbered
by moral ties they have not chosen.50 As a result, the Court no longer
justified the rights of free speech and association on the grounds that
they are important for the pursuit of truth or the exercise of selfgovernment; the Court justified these rights in the name of individual
fulfillment and self-creation.51 Free speech and association were no
longer considered to derive from the collective or ascriptive
affiliations, but explained on personal and voluntary grounds. In
short, the Court decreed that individuals should have the right to
44. Id. at 735.
45. See generally PUTNAM, supra note 5, app. at 437–44.
46. SANDEL, supra note 1, at 117.
47. Civic Virtue at Work, supra note 27, at 294.
48. SANDEL, supra note 1.
49. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that states
cannot compel children to pledge allegiance to the country at the start of each school day).
50. See SANDEL, supra note 1, at 50–52.
51. See id. at 53–55, 79–80.
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decide for themselves what they want to say and hear and what
groups they want to join or not join. It is no surprise, then, to see in
the Court’s decisions a growing animosity towards group duties and
attachments. Increasingly, the Court considers associational life as a
threat to self-creation. As Kohler notes, we see this in the rise of the
freedom not to associate.52 A large part of First Amendment law is
now dedicated to sheltering individuals from associational
obligation.53 Persons should have the right to contract with others to
serve their ends, but should not be bound by that association beyond
the contract. They should have the right to leave a group when they
want, and should not be penalized by the group for exercising that
right.
A brief history of the Wagner Act is useful when examining
changes in the labor law. Enacted in 1935, the Wagner Act54 was
designed to protect and enhance the status of individuals by defending the right to join autonomous employee groups and to bargain with
employers over the conditions of employment. The Act is unique
because, unlike other liberal legislation providing private rights of
action, it encourages the creation of mediating bodies “to promote
individual empowerment and to foster self-determination.”55
Through collective bargaining, the Wagner Act helps to involve
individuals in the process of making the rules that determine their
lives. The affected parties—employees, employer, and union—alone
work out their disputes with their agreement standing as “a system of
industrial self-government.”56 The state is not to intervene. For
example, it has long been held that the state cannot force any side to
accept any specific contract terms57 and cannot regulate the choice of
economic weapons that may be used.58
The Wagner Act is not unlike other liberal legislation in that it
serves to level the playing field. If businesspersons are allowed to
52. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule, supra note 26, at 181–86.
53. Id. A seminal case is Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), where
the Court held that government employees working in a unionized workplace may be required
to pay union services charges, but that the First Amendment was violated where they were
forced to pay for expression of political views with which they disagreed.
54. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1992).
55. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, supra note 24, at 732–34; see
also Walzer, supra note 6, at 17 (“This was not a standard liberal law, hindering the hindrances
of union organization, for it actively fostered union organization.”).
56. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580
(1960).
57. NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
58. NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
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organize into corporations, why should workers not be allowed to
organize into unions? The Act stands in contrast to earlier attempts
at political reform by groups such as the Knights of Labor.59 Its focus
is freedom of contract. It does not attempt system-wide reform; it
embraces rather than challenges the wage system.60 In adopting a
system of “industrial democracy,” the Act lays out means for
promoting economic equality. It allows workers to organize as a
check against industrial despotism and brings a rule of law to the
workplace. “Industrial democracy” does not mean management by
democracy, giving workers the power to remove and elect managers.
It means that workers have the right to seek redress of their grievances against management.61
Stated succinctly, the republican view, Kohler’s view, sees the
union as a positive in itself, since participation in the union allows
workers to develop the habits necessary for self-direction. In
adopting a private system of ordering, where the parties themselves
resolve their common concerns, the Act recognizes that the union is
an independent association with its own personality and moral
purposes. Along these lines, Kohler notes that through the Act,
Congress did not invent collective bargaining, but only adopted a
scheme that had been developed over time by workers and employers.62 The Act did not create unions, but simply acknowledged their
existence. By contrast, the liberal view sees the union merely as a
means to secure strategic ends, such as income, for its members. The
Act permits unionization for the purposes of self-help, but the union
is limited to the purposes for which employees originally joined.
Like constitutional law, labor law has undergone a transformation over the past century. The Taft-Hartley Amendments are the
best evidence. Originally, the Wagner Act simply stated: “Employees
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the

59. Following a republican view, the Knights believed that popular government depended
upon the virtue of the masses for its success. In their eyes, the wage labor system was a threat to
society as it bred dependence and vice. Accordingly, they called for the creation of a
cooperative commonwealth to restore the independence of workers. SANDEL, supra note 1, at
185–87.
60. See id. at 197–200.
61. See Richard R. Carlson, The Origin and Future of Exclusive Representation in
American Labor Law, 30 DUQ. L. REV. 779, 809–10 (1990).
62. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, supra note 24, at 734.
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purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”63
However, in 1947 Congress added that employees “shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities.”64 In contrast to the
old section 7, under which the government openly encouraged
unionization, the new Section 7 emphasized employee choice. By
putting association on equal terms with nonassociation, the new
section shows a distrust of association. It inhibits the formation of
unions. The organized are not as concerned if the government
remains neutral. But, the unorganized, who are easily cowed by the
imbalance of power between employer and employee, need the
government to be proactive. There is a significant psychological
difference between “the President wants you to unionize” and “the
President could care less if you unionize.” Moreover, the new section
suggests that individuals do not need a union to get just as much out
of the workplace. The union is simply an affiliation—no more, no
less. Employees may ally themselves with others, but only they may
make that choice. Employees may join a union with the hope of
securing additional income, but those who choose not to join are only
giving up on the hope that the union can secure more.
Further indications of a shift from a republican to a liberal conception of the self in labor law appear in the state’s growing role in
the workplace.65 Congress and state legislatures continue to expand
prohibitions against discrimination in employment decisions.66 Where
unions once took up these issues in collective bargaining, the law now
dictates them. In addition, common law courts have developed a tort
of wrongful termination. Typically, an employee may sue if he thinks
he has been fired in violation of public policy. The aim is congruence
between the workplace and public norms and culture. To protect
individual choice, work life cannot deviate too far from public life.
Finally, the Supreme Court has imposed upon unions a duty of fair
representation of their members.67 Noting the power of the union
majority, the Court deemed it necessary to develop a doctrine to
protect minority union members.68 Because the union is so powerful,

63.
64.
65.
737.
66.
(1992).
67.
68.

29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1992).
See generally Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, supra note 24, at
Consider, for example, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102–12213
See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
See id. at 177–78.
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in that individuals who are excluded from its processes bear serious
costs, the state may treat the union as an arm of the state, subjecting it
to similar standards of respect for individual rights.
C.

A Pragmatic View

Let us reconsider our discontent. According to Sandel and
Kohler, because of political liberalism, society is now the home of
isolated, egotistical agents. We are directionless and divided by our
rights. We have at last shed the weight of superstition, as public
reason is paramount, but find ourselves “slipping into a fragmented,
storyless condition.”69 If this description were right, though, one
would think that liberalism would be the best way to deal with our
political predicament. If we are isolated selves, and if we have to
build a society, should we not begin from Rawls’s original position,
where from some imaginary point we are forced to find ways to agree
with one another? Given our increasing division and difference,
should we not try reform based upon that division and difference? If
society is so fragmented, then our first concern should be procedural
justice. We must take as our guide a principle of tolerance between
members of conflicting associations. So long as people have a variety
of exclusive ends, government ought not to favor one group over
another, but should treat each with equal respect.
The above is a pragmatic view. It contends that theorists like
Sandel and Kohler should give up on a return to virtue. Their
arguments take on a romantic longing, if not for the past, then for
some overarching ideal. Sandel and Kohler might respond that it is
not that society is hopelessly fragmented, but that liberalism misrepresents our true condition. Kohler writes: “People are by nature
social beings.”70 Thus, when liberals speak of autonomous selves and
argue that all obligations are contractual, they are lying to themselves.
Individuals cannot escape community. We just do not see that we are
bound together. However, this argument makes the mistake of
granting liberalism as a public philosophy too much power. Sandel
argues that public philosophy is implicit in our social practices.71
Similarly, Kohler states, “Ideas do have consequences.”72 But is it not
the case that according to Sandel’s and Kohler’s accounts of the
69.
70.
71.
72.

SANDEL, supra note 1, at 351.
Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work, supra note 27, at 299.
SANDEL, supra note 1, at ix–x.
Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule, supra note 26, at 208.
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liberal conception of freedom, that conception is not the cause of all
our problems but simply is an expression of our problems? One
wonders why the republican view lost to the liberal view. There are
countless material explanations for the recent transformations in
constitutional and labor law, not the least of which are the industrial
revolution and, later, globalization. One wonders why republicanism,
if right, cannot summon our buried social feelings, our connections,
and our traditions. On this point, I think Sandel and Kohler make the
mistake of forgetting that liberalism—“rights talk”—is our tradition.
This country is the product of continuing aspirations for greater
freedom—from the church, from other men, and from our own fears.
If we really are situated beings, we should not shirk those aspirations.
Perhaps, then, Sandel and Kohler are wrong to think that once
we have a correct conception of the self we can right society. As
Richard Rorty argues, it is not clear that a correct conception of the
self helps:
But we minimalist liberals do not need a theory of the self to make
a distinction between more reflective and less reflective people.
We can just say that you get more reflective people, people better
suited for the responsibilities of self-government, whenever you
provide more education, security, leisure. This is not a philosophical point, but just the empirical observation that people who enjoy
more of these three goods are better able to consider alternative
scenarios for their personal futures, and for the futures of their societies.73

Rorty in fact agrees with Sandel’s understanding of the self. He sees
the self as a “network of beliefs and desires.”74 Pursuing such a
historical view, he thinks it a mistake to try to measure society by
asking whether its citizens have the right beliefs. The only means he
sees that we have for measuring our society is to compare ourselves to
other societies and our own history.75 If that is the case, then our
society is not doing so poorly after all, as our society has “the best
track record among the regimes which we have tried so far.”76 This
puts us back in the position of having to accept our society’s history
and traditions. In liberal societies, many people benefit from
education, security, and leisure. These people generally fare well in
73. Richard Rorty, A Defense of Minimalist Liberalism, in DEBATING DEMOCRACY’S
DISCONTENT, supra note 13, at 117, 118–19.
74. Id. at 119.
75. Id. at 118–19.
76. Id. Even Sandel notes our country’s achievements over the last half-century, including
“victory in World War II, unprecedented affluence, greater social justice for women and
minorities, [and] the end of the Cold War.” SANDEL, supra note 1, at 3.
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society and often create good ideas on how to improve society. Of
course, this is an American-centric history. But it is unclear whether
reason can reach beyond our history. Stated differently, we might
criticize religious fundamentalists as bad citizens not because their
ideas are based on the wrong conception of the self, but because
under our tradition their ideas cannot be taken seriously. We attempt
to engage them in political debate, but they refuse to consider other
viewpoints.77
There is considerable diversity in our country today, and a great
number of distinct groups because of that diversity. It is not apparent
that such groups serve society well under either a republican or
liberal view. Individuals increasingly feel divided from one another,
resulting in a fragmented social condition. What we need, then, is
reform based upon that fragmentation. For unions, this means, for
example, seriously considering the widespread use of contingent work
arrangements.78 Most unions have been undecided about how to
handle contingent workers because most unions are organized around
a single plant or industry where workers only get the benefit of the
union once they come to that plant or industry. But, one idea is for
unions to serve as temporary agencies for contingent workers. This is
not a new idea in the sense that many craft unions serve as training
centers and hiring halls. It suggests, though, that unions can exist for
purposes other than collective bargaining. That is, we need not
define the role of unions to and by the negotiation of wage rates and
health benefits. We can think of unions also as serving, and developing, the whole person. Further, with the plethora of federal and state
statutes now applicable to the workplace, unions are needed to watch
over the workplace. Most employees do not understand regulations
about employment discrimination and health and safety, but unions
do. By the same token, unions may serve as political advocates.
Because many contingent workers are women and minorities, unions
can provide them the voice they lack in the political arena.

77. Nevertheless, republican ideas are an integral part of our tradition and we can engage
republican thinkers in political debate.
78. See Matthew Finkin, The Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts of Nonmajority Employee
Representation, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195, 217–18 (1993) [hereinafter Finkin, Road Not Taken].
A statistical snapshot taken in February 1995 showed that contingent workers constituted
between 2.2 percent to 4.9 percent of the workforce, and that somewhere between 5 and 12.8
percent of part-time workers were contingent. Further, a disproportionate number of
contingent workers were female and black. See also Thomas C. Kohler & Matthew W. Finkin,
Bonding and Flexibility: Employment Ordering in a Relationless Age, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 379,
400 (1998).
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II. THE PROBLEM OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION
A healthy skepticism of republicanism, coupled with a view that
collective bargaining need not be the only, or defining, concern of
unions, suggests that we revisit the principles of labor law. Specifically, I want to explore the concept of exclusive representation. The
current conception of majority rule is rooted in a republican view of
associations, modified by a liberal concern for minority rights. I
believe a better scheme of nonmajority representation may be rooted
in a pragmatic view of our fragmentation.
Section 9(a) of the Wagner Act provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all
the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment.79

Kohler notes that the “exclusivity principle bottoms the American
model of collective bargaining.”80 He explains:
The exclusivity principle rests on the idea of majority rule. The
principle establishes the association formed by a majority of
employees in the affected workplace unit as the exclusive
representative of them all. The principle prohibits an employer
from attempting to bypass the majority-designated representative
by unilaterally changing the terms or conditions of employment, or
by dealing with individuals or groups independently of the union.81

Prior to the Wagner Act, trade unions generally bargained just for
their members. If a union wanted exclusivity, the union had to coerce
it from both the employer and the employees it wanted to serve.82
Naturally, such coercion raised doubts as to the legitimacy of the
union’s claim to exclusive representation. It was clearly lawful for
unions to compel participation by shunning nonmembers. But it was
clearly wrong for unions to prohibit employers from hiring nonmembers.83 As a result, when Congress drafted the Wagner Act,
labor leaders sought to include section 9(a) to supply a legal basis,
and thereby greater legitimacy, to exclusive representation.84 Of
79. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1992).
80. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, supra note 24, at 733.
81. Id.
82. Carlson, supra note 61, at 791–803.
83. Id. at 792.
84. Id. at 810–11; Kenneth Casebeer, Drafting Wagner’s Act: Leon Keyserling and the
Precommittee Drafts of the Labor Disputes Act and the National Labor Relations Act, 11 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 73, 97–98 (1989).
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course, the law is no less coercive; the reasons behind the principle
lend it legitimacy.
It is easy to see why republicans find the exclusivity principle so
appealing. For republicans, majority rule is the cardinal means of
political action. Every member of the community must have the
opportunity to come together and discuss the pros and cons of a
certain proposal before the community may take action.85 The people
do not decide upon the common good through coercion, but through
persuasion and habituation. By contrast, liberals find the principle, at
least theoretically, less appealing. For liberals, majority rule poses a
threat to individual freedom. It restricts choice and leads to
oppression. In groups that are run by majority rule, liberals want
some individual protection or the right to come and go. Liberals
appreciate that the Wagner Act ensures the right to organize and
protects individuals from discrimination by their employers because
of their union affiliation. But they do not see why individuals must
give up control of their lives to a union, especially if they feel that
they can do better without one. Individuals should have the right to
join a union, but also should have the right not to join.
Recall that under the republican conception of freedom, democracy is realized through a network of independent groups operating
within, but independent of, the state. Often, these groups claim our
allegiance. This means that our choice to ally ourselves with them is
not voluntary. For example, Robert E. Lee opposed secession; yet,
he concluded that his obligation to the South outweighed his obligation to the Union. Lee would have sided with the Union had he been
able to make that decision free of all other considerations. But,
certain factors limited his freedom of choice. Nevertheless, Sandel
and Kohler praise involuntary associations because they can cultivate
the virtues necessary for self-government. Lee recognized that his
association with the South was, in a sense, an involuntary tie that
superceded personal choice. Though we may not approve of the

85. Tocqueville writes:
What is understood by a republican government in the United States is the slow and
quiet action of society upon itself. It is a regular state of things really founded upon
the enlightened will of the people. It is a conciliatory government, under which
resolutions are allowed time to ripen, and in which they are deliberately discussed, and
are executed only when mature. . . . What is called the republic in the United States is
the tranquil rule of the majority, which, after having had time to examine itself and to
give proof of its existence, is the common source of all powers of the state.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 416 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve
trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1835).
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choice he made, Lee was conscious of the circumstances of his life,
and conversely aware of broader possibilities. Democracy depends,
then, upon involuntary associations. Citizens can be free and selfgoverning without having the right to leave an association just
because they would prefer not to be part of that association.
Similarly, then, employees may be subject to a union.
By contrast, under the liberal conception of freedom, democracy
is realized through a network of groups that exist independently of
the state. The classic formulation is that the interplay between
various groups prevents permanent division into majority and
minority.86 The state is neutral, while groups compete for members.
As such, no group can make an exclusive claim to an individual’s
allegiance, and every group must allow members to leave when they
choose. This view is premised on the ability of individuals to choose
between their groups and their values, to be unencumbered selves
who can freely pursue their personal preferences. It follows that
liberals advocate an open freedom of association: “The liberal
separation between public and private spheres, and endorsement of
pluralism within them, encourages both access to groups in which one
has ‘voice’ and the possibility of ‘exit’ from them as equally important
parts of freedom of association.”87 Democracy depends, then, upon
voluntary association. When liberals confront a group that is not
voluntary because it exercises so much power over its members and
that it is impossible for them to leave, then the liberals suggest the
state may remove the group’s ability to sanction members or that the
group should be held to constitutional standards. An employee
should then have the right not to join others in a union.
Two types of arguments are made in support of the exclusivity
principle. First, the principle is necessary for readjusting the balance
of power between management and labor. It is easy to see how
unanimous cooperation is helpful in bargaining. If even a few
employees are able to bypass the union’s control of collective
bargaining and negotiate their own wages and benefits, then others
will soon view unions as unnecessary and try to negotiate their own
wages and benefits.88 Any variation in contract terms sends the
message that things could be better without the union and thus is a
86. This is Madison’s method for providing against majority tyranny. THE FEDERALIST
NO. 51 (James Madison).
87. ROSENBLUM, supra note 35, at 60 (taking the terms from ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN,
EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970)).
88. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
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threat to the union. Also, without exclusive representation, disruptive competition between unions could arise. An employer might
encourage a union to compromise by offering to recognize it over
another union.89 Exclusive representation is necessary to maintain
orderly industrial relations. It is, at the very least, an administrative
headache for an employer to deal with multiple unions representing
otherwise identical employees.90 Conversely, an employer can take
seriously a union’s no-strike pledge where one union is in control,
since there is less of a threat of individual action like a wildcat strike.91
Various commentators are unpersuaded by the argument that
the principle is necessary for readjusting the balance of power
between management and labor. They have suggested in its place a
scheme of “members only” representation. Their contentions need
not be fully repeated here. Simply put, they find the benefits of
exclusive representation overblown, and think alternative models not
only workable92 but also essential if unions are to survive.93 Consider
that the Wagner Act does not give unions the benefit of exclusivity in
strikes, as an employee can resign her membership and cross a picket
line.94 Nor does the Act give unions the benefit of exclusivity when it
comes to financial support, as states may grant employees in a
unionized workplace the option of not paying union dues.95 It may be
that unanimous cooperation is not necessary for strikes and financial
support. Strikes of even limited numbers can cause enough trouble to
force an employer to make concessions. And many employees will
want to join the union so they can participate in its governance and be
involved in decisions about bargaining. But these arguments support
the proposition that nonmajority unions may be as effective as
majority unions. Moreover, exclusivity does not necessarily improve
a union’s ability to get a good contract. For example, if the union
strikes when members are divided over an offer, some members may
89. However, section 8(a)(2) of the Wagner Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to form its own associations or contribute support to one union over another. 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1992).
90. Finkin, Road Not Taken, supra note 78, at 200.
91. Carlson, supra note 61, at 789.
92. George Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of
Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 926–32 (1975)
(stating that nonmajority representation would make unions more responsive); see also Finkin,
Road Not Taken, supra note 78, at 207–18.
93. Carlson, supra note 61, at 849–61 (arguing that new forms of representation may be
more attractive to the unrepresented).
94. See Pattern Makers’ League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1992).
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choose to cross the picket line and the union might not have the
internal strength to reject the offer.
The second type of argument in support of exclusivity analogizes
to the political model. The drafters of the Wagner Act adapted a
theory of “industrial democracy” to collective bargaining.96 Reformists believed that collective bargaining ought to be more than the
negotiation of terms and conditions of employment. It should lead to
the creation of a “constitution” for the workplace.97 If “industrial
democracy” did not mean management by democracy, it at least
implied majority rule, and the claim that the union, if democratically
elected by a majority of employees, should have the right to speak for
all.98 In two early cases—J.I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board99 and Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.100—the
Supreme Court took up the legal aspects of majority rule.
In J.I. Case Co., the employer had offered each of its employees
individual contracts for one year.101 About 75 percent of the employees accepted.102 During the time that the contracts were in effect, a
union petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for an election.103 The union won the election, but the employer refused to
bargain on the grounds that its individual contracts with its employees
precluded it from dealing with the union in any matter affecting the
rights and obligations of its employees.104 The Board disagreed, and
the Supreme Court affirmed.105 The Court ruled that
[i]ndividual contracts, no matter what the circumstances that justify
their execution or what their terms, may not be availed of to defeat
or delay the procedures prescribed by the National Labor Relations
Act looking to the collective bargaining, nor to exclude the contracting employee from a duly ascertained bargaining unit.106

The Court reasoned that the very purpose of the statute goes to group
concerns.107 The Act has a collective rather than individual focus.
96.
(1945).
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Ruth Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 556, 561
Carlson, supra note 61, at 809.
Weyand, supra note 96, at 562–64.
321 U.S. 332 (1944).
323 U.S. 192 (1944).
J.I. Case Co., 321 U.S. at 333.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 333, 334.
Id. at 334, 342.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 338.
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Accordingly, the Court dispelled any notion that an individual
employee should have the freedom to contract if he can get better
terms. Such a notion is both disruptive and selfish:
[A]dvantages to individuals may prove as disruptive of industrial
peace as disadvantages. They are a fruitful way of interfering with
organization and choice of representatives; increased compensation, if individually deserved, is often earned at the cost of breaking
down some other standard thought to be for the welfare of the
group, and always creates the suspicion of being paid at the longrange expense of the group as a whole.108

Moreover, such a notion is undemocratic in the sense of being
antimajoritarian:
The workman is free, if he values his own bargaining position more
than that of the group, to vote against representation; but the majority rules, and if it collectivizes the employment bargain, individual advantages or favors will generally in practice go in as a contribution to the collective result.109

The Court’s ruling in J.I. Case Co. is extraordinary for its attention to the collective. It is a fascinating testament to the need for
individual choice and the power of associations over individual
choice. The Court envisions the state having to force the individual
to join the collective for the good of the collective. It is only through
the union that a worker obtains any real freedom in the workplace.
Further, the Court indicates that the union is sovereign, and no
employee can change its law to his or her benefit. This is decidedly a
republican vision of democracy, one that hinges on involuntary
association rather than individual consent.110
However, the Court was quick to qualify its position. In Steele,
decided shortly after J.I. Case Co., the union was the exclusive
bargaining agent for a craft of firemen.111 A majority of the firemen
were white, but a substantial number were black.112 All the whites
were members, but blacks could not be, though they were required to

108. Id. at 338–39.
109. Id. at 339.
110. Sheldon Leader has similarly remarked that exclusivity represents a pluralist vision of
democracy—a “system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized
into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed [if not created] by the state and
granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories.” LEADER,
supra note 37, at 165 (citing Phillippe C. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, 36 REV.
POL. 85 (1974)).
111. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 194 (1944).
112. Id.
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accept the union as their representative.113 The union and employer, a
railroad, then entered into an agreement restricting the seniority
rights of blacks.114 The question before the Court was whether the
union had a duty to represent all the employees in the craft without
discrimination on account of race.115 Although the Court did not hold
that the union was a state actor, it first drew an analogy between
unions and legislatures:
[T]he representative is clothed with power not unlike that of a legislature which is subject to constitutional limitations on its power to
deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate against the rights of those for
whom it legislates and which is also under an affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect those rights.116

The Court went on to find that the union had to have some duty to
represent every employee, regardless of their race.117 Otherwise, the
Court held, the majority could ride roughshod over the rights of the
minority:
Unless the labor union representing a craft owes some duty to represent non-union members of the craft, at least to the extent of not
discriminating against them as such in the contracts which it makes
as their representative, the minority would be left with no means of
protecting their interests, or indeed their right to earn a livelihood
by pursuing the occupation in which they are employed.118

The Court phrased its reasoning in terms of equal protection:
“Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with
powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to
create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents, but it has
also imposed upon the representative a corresponding duty.”119 The
Court did accept that unions could make rational distinctions
between employees, such as differences in seniority or skill.120
However, discriminations based upon race were automatically
irrelevant.121
Steele is best characterized as a liberal corrective. If J.I. Case Co.
establishes majority rule, Steele guards against majority tyranny by
making it the job of the courts to ensure the rights of minority
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 194–95.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 198–99.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 201.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 203.
Id.
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members. As noted above, to protect against majority tyranny, the
state may hold involuntary associations to constitutional standards.
In a democracy, individuals must have the right to leave groups when
they want. Of course, it can be argued that unions are not entirely
involuntary in the sense that employees can always quit their jobs.
But, this is unpersuasive because often the costs of leaving a job are
too high for it to be considered a choice. The state, then, must
intervene on behalf of the employee where the union trammels the
employee’s rights.
The Court in Steele makes plain that the union, as a legislature,
may be treated as an arm of the state. The Court espouses a liberal
conception of freedom. Accordingly, we also see behind its reasoning
an affirmation of a liberal conception of the self. In this respect, it is
interesting to note how Steele parallels the reasoning of United States
v. Carolene Products Co.’s famous footnote.122 First, judicial intervention may be required to insure access to the political process. By
excluding blacks from membership, the union was denying blacks
their voice. Second, intervention may be required where prejudice
infects the political process, since “prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities.”123
Note that in Steele the Court separates distinctions based upon
race from distinctions based upon relevant factors such as seniority.124
The Court will allow union policies that make reasonable distinctions
among employees.125 At first blush, this difference seems difficult to
defend. Why are civil liberties more important than economic
liberties? The answer turns on, as Sandel argues, the liberal conception of self.126 Perhaps in eighteenth-century America it was fair to
say that individuals were free moral agents and could freely contract.
127
But today inequalities of bargaining power undercut that freedom.
Individuals simply cannot quit jobs they do not like—economic
conditions make doing so impossible. Thus, legislatures should be
122. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
123. Id.
124. Steele, 323 U.S. at 203.
125. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
126. SANDEL, supra note 1, at 47–53.
127. Underlying this view are laissez-faire assumptions: “The railroad employee required by
his employer to choose between his union membership and his job is thus ‘a free agent . . . at
liberty to choose what was best from the standpoint of his own interests . . . [and] free to
exercise a voluntary choice.’” Id. at 50 (citing Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 9 (1915)).
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allowed to regulate the market and thereby limit freedom of contract
in order to realize greater freedom of contract. Government
intervention facilitates freedom. It provides economic security that
results in leveling the playing field and providing the equality
necessary for freedom of contract. In fact, what justifies democracy is
that it enables the right of every person to choose his or her own
ends, regardless of social position.128 Thus, the union as legislature
must be free to make economic policy. In practice, this means that
the union’s political process must be open to all, and decisions must
be made by majority rule. Under the liberal model, each employee
has an equal right to express his or her preferences. It also means
that the majority should not be able to vote into effect an oppressive
or prejudiced agenda. If the union majority could vote such an
agenda into effect, the democratic process would produce policies
based upon beliefs that some persons are intrinsically worth less than
others. That runs contrary to the notion that persons should be free
to choose regardless of their position in society.
Steele is only a partial liberal correction. It does not give minority employees the choice of having their own union or even no union;
that is, it does not create an absolute right of voice and exit. But, accepting the analogy of union as legislature,129 there is no reason why
democracy requires exclusive representation. Democracy can also be
achieved through proportional representation. In an old Labor
Board case, Houde Engineering Corp.,130 such a scheme was in fact
debated but ultimately dismissed in favor of exclusive representation.
In Houde Engineering Corp., the employer faced two employee
groups, the minority an outgrowth of the company’s athletic association and the majority affiliated with the United Automobile Workers.131 At the hearing, the employer suggested that it could bargain
and enter into an agreement with a “composite committee” of the
representatives of the association and the union.132 The Board conceded that such a scheme would, on its face, be “just and democ-

128. Id. at 52.
129. Professor Matthew Finkin has argued that the political analogy is flawed. Employees
have no alternatives if they do not like the union, whereas disgruntled citizens may always swing
their support to other members of the legislature. Finkin, Road Not Taken, supra note 78, at
211.
130. In re Houde Eng’g Corp. & United Auto. Workers Fed. Labor Union No. 18839, 1
NLRB (Old) 35 (1934).
131. Id. at 37.
132. Id. at 40.
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ratic,”133 but concluded that, even if such an agreement could be
reached, it would not make much difference because a majority of the
committee would have to consent to any agreement.134 Hence the
majority representative would still control.135 The Board then added
that proportional representation could also breed “dissention and
rivalry” within the ranks destructive to the bargaining process.136 Too
many voices would complicate bargaining and cause the unions to
undercut one another.
The Board’s ruling in Houde Engineering Corp. was practical. Its
concern was improving the status of employees, and exclusive
representation seemed at the time the best way to do this. Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons why proportional representation,
or a scheme of coalition bargaining, with multiple unions representing
multiple employee interests, might be preferred. Most importantly,
why should one union, and not the employer, have to deal with
employees’ conflicting interests? Exclusivity transfers to the union
the responsibility of resolving employee differences before bargaining.137 But it is not clear that the union is any better suited to
resolving deep differences.
Consider, for example, Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization,138 where a group of black employees,
refusing to take their grievances through a joint union-management
Adjustment Board, demanded that their employer negotiate with
them directly over issues of employment discrimination in assignments and promotions.139 When the employer refused, the employees
picketed, and as a result were terminated.140 The Court ruled that the
employees had not engaged in concerted activity protected under the
Act, and thus could be terminated because the employees had
circumvented the union to engage in bargaining.141 The Court
reasoned that concerns for industrial order outweighed the right of
the minority to act.142 It noted that an employer confronted with
demands from multiple groups would not necessarily be able to
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Carlson, supra note 61, at 814; Finkin, Road Not Taken, supra note 78, at 208.
420 U.S. 50 (1975).
Id. at 54–55.
Id. at 55–56.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 68–69.
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satisfy them all at once, and that the union has a legitimate interest in
presenting a united front and in not seeing its strength dissipated by
subgroups pursuing separate interests.143 Interestingly, the black
employees did not raise the issue of whether the union had breached
its duty of fair representation. On the one hand, this might evidence
that the union was not all that divided, and thus the union, rather
than the employer, could best attend to their grievances. On the
other hand, the burden on the employee in a fair representation claim
is heavy. The employee must show that the union action was
“arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.”144 Thus, the white workers
in the union may have been tolerant, but the black workers’
disagreement with the whites over skilled jobs or affirmative action
was so deep-seated that conflict was inevitable. And if this was the
case, the black workers could never get fair representation, and they
would always be worse off with a union. In such circumstances, it
seems unduly harsh to say that the minority cannot bypass the
majority. It was not as if the minority was attempting to speak for the
majority. It simply wanted a voice of its own.
Are racial divisions unique or may other differences, such as
class divisions, also benefit from a system of nonmajority representation? Steele indicates that unions may differentiate among workers
on the basis of skill.145 Where those who are financially better off
suffer by union representation, the liberal vision of freedom undergirding the duty of fair representation is satisfied. The wealth is
simply being more evenly distributed. However, where those at the
bottom of the scale are always worse off, such as with a contract that
provides good pensions but low wages, it cannot be argued on the
grounds of distributive justice that the majority should rule. Those at
the bottom may be better off without representation at all. Yet
allowing those at the bottom to form their own union, that is, allowing
proportional representation, could present another problem. For
example, in a union of permanent and contingent workers, where the
permanent workers are the minority, the contingent workers are
usually better off. In such a case, the union will aim for a wage just
high enough to please the permanent workers, whom the employer
wants to keep, with the excess going to the contingent workers. By
contrast, under proportional representation, if the permanent
143. Id. at 67–70.
144. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
145. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944).
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workers are allowed to form their own union, the permanent workers
may realize their full worth on their own. The contingent workers
cannot then get as much, as the employer does not need to offer them
as much because the employer views them as easily replaceable.
Thus, under proportional representation, the wage gap increases.146
Of course, we do not want greater wage inequality. But, this possibility considers that the union only exists for the sake of collective
bargaining. It is entirely feasible that contingent workers may want
their own voice for other reasons. They may want a union that will
help them get other jobs or train them in new skills. Or, they may
want a union that pushes for political change, like living-wage
legislation. This is not to say economic difference is tantamount to
racial or religious difference, but that differences must be tolerated.
This is a pragmatic view based upon our fragmentation. As long as
individuals have different ends because of their backgrounds,
government ought not allow one group of individuals supremacy over
another.
Note that proportional representation, in protecting individual
freedom of choice, bolsters the best of what republicans and liberals
see in unions as associations. Kohler argues that unions should be as
small as practicable, as small groups better facilitate deliberation:
“They make more likely the personal knowledge, friendship and trust
among participants that ground the possibility of conversation and
consensus.”147 Proportional representation allows employees to
divide into smaller, more homogenous groups. Each union in the
workplace may stand for an interest, such as affirmative action or
lower pensions and higher wages. To be sure, proportional representation could lead to greater balkanization. Do we really want white
unions and black unions? On the other hand, if there are more
unions, there is more choice, and we might find that workers of
different stripes share common ground on certain issues. Additionally, proportional representation might encourage greater employee
participation in the inner workings of their union.148 Under a
republican view, we must hope for such debate. Under a liberal view,
the state ensures such debate. But, if employees could form their own
union, they could demand and expect greater responsiveness from it.

146. Professor George Schatzki outlined this situation, though his example used skilled and
unskilled workers. Schatzki, supra note 92, at 933.
147. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule, supra note 26, at 204.
148. See Schatzki, supra note 92, at 921–26.
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Competition for members could even arise between unions. At the
least, as unions would stand for an interest, employees would know
that their union would be fighting for their interest. Reciprocally, the
state would not need to monitor unions’ inner workings. As noted,
under the liberal view, the state preserves the right of exit by limiting
the power that private groups exercise over their members. But,
under a pragmatic view, just because groups have to be tolerant of
one another does not mean that they have to be tolerant of their
members. Assuming members of groups are bound by their ends,
mutual respect for political purposes only requires that groups agree
to let members of other groups pursue their own ends. It does not
require groups to allow their members to pursue different ends.
Thus, under proportional representation, there would be no duty of
fair representation. Unions would not have to respect dissent.
CONCLUSION
Michael Sandel and Thomas Kohler offer an intriguing portrait
of unions as mediating bodies based upon a republican, rather than
liberal, conception of the self. However, in their concern for our
increasing fragmentation, they fail to consider that reform may best
begin with such fragmentation. We do not need a correct conception
of the self to make a good society; we need a system for connecting
differently encumbered selves. Applying this view to labor law, we
should adopt a system of nonmajority representation, or proportional
representation, allowing smaller groups of employees to form their
own unions to fulfill their own ends.

